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FARLEY v. SARTIN AND TORT CLAIMS FOR THE
WRONGFUL DEATH OF A NONVIABLE FETUS:

PARADIGMS, IMPONDERABLES AND PROPOSALS

Teree E. Foster*
Perhaps the most intractable problem with which human beings have
struggled throughout the latter decades of the twentieth century pertains to life
itself: its definition, genesis, quality and cessation. Scientific progress
unimaginable at the outset of this century has heralded shifting paradigms and
intricate ethical and legal questions for which courts struggle to articulate
approaches: among others, the definition of "parenthood" in the context of
surrogacy; the ownership rights in frozen embryos; the moral and legal questions
associated with the cloning of human beings; the choice of a gravely ill person
to plan death, and to rely upon trained medical assistance to effectuate those
plans.
When does "life" begin? When does a fetus metamorphosize from
embryonic matter to personhood, possessed of protectable rights? Is viability the
touchstone? As medical science shifts viability - the ability of a fetus to survive
outside the womb - earlier and earlier during the second trimester of pregnancy,
does viability remain a feasible touchstone? Is viability the only touchstone?
Does the latitudinal location of this transformative moment from embryo to
person migrate, depending upon the reason for identifying it? When does loss of
a fetus through tortious conduct constitute a compensable wrong to its parents?
To the fetus?
In Farley v. Sartin,' the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
held, in an opinion authored by Justice Franklin D. Cleckley, that West Virginia's
wrongful death statutory definition of "person" encompasses a nonviable unborn
child, and that a tort cause of action for the death of that unborn child is
actionable.2 Farley v. Sartin identifies West Virginia as the only state to permit

° Dean and Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
2 Justice Cleckley prefers the term "unborn child" to "fetus," because the latter term is descriptive

of development from the post-embryonic stage, approximately seven or eight weeks after
conception, until birth; the former term emphasizes that the crux of the opinion is the timing of
viability: "from conception to viability and viability to birth." Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 523 n.3.
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recovery for the death of a nonviable unborn child without express legislative
direction. To what extent is the comparative conduct of the parents, as it affects
fetal development, a relevant concern when the life of a nonviable fetus is
tortiously ended? What is the appropriate measure of damages, and what
evidence should be admissible thereon? Does recognition of a tort cause of
action for wrongful death of a nonviable fetus undermine women's reproductive
autonomy and lend support to those who seek to subvert the principle of maternal
choice enshrined in Roe v. Wade?3 Should the ambit of child abuse and
endangerment laws now be enlarged to protect unborn children from prenatal
substance abuse? And, the perennial issue that suffuses questions of this ilk is the judiciary the appropriate decisional body, or should these fundamental
issues be reserved to the legislature for resolution?
This symposium explores some of the ramifications of this momentous
decision, and offers proposals that address these imponderable issues.

3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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